Archive for the ‘历史存档’ Category
推荐：《历史有生命力 东亚150年》
我的个人兴趣主要在历史和社会学。其实各个国家都有面对本国历史负面的问题，然而，由于经济和文化上的原因，东亚的历史教育在这方面的问题更加严重。近年来，由于在历史教育上的做法，特别是在涉及他国的情况下，东亚频频出现国与国之间的历史教科书“战争”。一些往往停留在学术界的讨论，放大到普通非学术的民众，造成更大的困惑，甚至是对立。在这种情况下，中日韩三国展开了一些历史研究合作，例如中日韩三国学者共同编纂的《东亚三国的近现代史》（《面向未来的历史》）。
今天在朝日新闻的网站上看到这个《历史有生命力 东亚150年》的专题。该专题是由日本学者撰写，目的是“向读者介绍‘历史’在东亚各国越来越受到瞩目的现状，以及在全球化进程中历史教育开始出现重大变化的新情况”。这儿所说的东亚各国，包括中国，日本，南韩，以及台湾。这个专题按照时间顺序，讲述了十个课题：
- 鸦片战争和明治维新
- 日清战争（甲午战争）和割让台湾
- 日俄战争和朝鲜的殖民地化
- 辛亥革命和民众运动
- 满洲事变和“满洲国”
- 日中战争
- 亚洲 太平洋战争和国共内战
- 朝鲜战争与越南战争
- 日韩日中邦交正常化
- 中国的改革开放和韩国台湾的民主化
每个专题分为上下两节，每节包括对该历史的简单表述；各国历史书对这段历史的描述；和一个对该区域历史学家或者历史教育学家的采访，让被采访者选出东亚近现代史的10件大事，并说明原因。
该专题最好的一点是，该专题虽然是由日本人撰写，但是却有韩语、中文简体、中文繁体及英语四种语言，全部内容可以在朝日新闻的网站上下载：
http://www.asahi.com/international/history/
我的博客朋友中，如果你对这个专题感兴趣，可以在这发表下你对这些历史的看法。
马英九“六四”十九周年感言
因为5.12地震和Obama的胜选，今年六四可能是最少关注的一次。我附录马英九总统的“六四”十九周年感言全文如下，以做为我对今年六四的纪念。
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馬英九總統今天發表「六四」十九週年感言，內容全文為：
自從1989年「六四」事件發生以來，每年屆時我都會參加紀念活動或發表文章。我對「六四」的關心，主要在於關心大陸同胞能否享有自由民主的生活。
今年「六四」跟往年最大的不同，就是在三週前，四川發生了大地震，災區廣達十餘萬平方公里，死傷超過四十萬人，至少五百萬人無家可歸。從大陸官方搶救災民的迅速、大陸首長對災民的關懷、災難及抗爭新聞報導的開放、大陸人民捐輸的踴躍、到對外國救援團隊的歡迎及對台灣救援工作的肯定，與1976年唐山大地震時期的表現已大大不同，國際媒體亦迭有佳評，顯示中國大陸改革開放三十年，已有一定的成果。
我在5月20日就職演說中，曾經表示：「我們真誠關心大陸十三億同胞的福祉，由衷盼望中國大陸能繼續走向自由民主均富的大道，為兩岸關係長遠的和平發展，創造雙贏的歷史條件。」今天我們關心「六四」真正的意義，也就在此。En jugar casino gratis el jugador puede apostar a cualquier combinación de números.
学术问题：汶川地震预测
update:
通过仔细研读第一篇文章，发现国家地理的这篇文章很不靠谱。Densmore et. al.的文章并不表明龙门山一带有立即的地震威胁，而只是指出这一带属于地震高危区。文章中说到：
Finally, our observations of fault activity in the late Pleistocene and Holocene have important implications for seismic hazard, particularly in the densely populated Sichuan Basin.
不会有严肃的科学家用这么大时间的观察结果来预测地震。而龙门山一带属于地震区，在地震学界相信不是秘密。
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今天，看到朋友推荐的国家地理杂志的文章Study Warned of China Quake Risk Nearly a Year Ago。这是我看到学术界唯一有分量的对汶川地震预测的相关研究。但是由于目前还不清楚的原因，中国各级政府无人知晓这个研究，或者对此研究做出反应。
这个研究主要通过对卫星影像和实地测量，揭示龙门山地震带有较为活跃的移动。文章的结论是：They also suggest that activity on the margin-parallel faults in eastern Tibet may represent a significant seismic hazard to the densely populated Sichuan Basin.
因为太模糊，这可能还说不上是有意义的地震预测。但是，如果四川省地震局和国家地震局对此重视，并做相关研究，能产生什么？我无法预测。
这个跨国团队有长达十年的合作研究。其中包括成都理工大学油气藏地质及开发工程国家重点实验室41岁的年轻教授李勇(liy@cdut.edu.cn)和四川省地震局工程地震研究院44岁研究员周荣军。
当然，也不排除他们自己也不认为他们的研究就能够精确到2008年5月12日下午14:30的汶川。
我希望有记者能够去采访这两位中国学者。希望任何方面，包括学界，政界无人阻止这样的采访。希望中国的地震学界能够以学术的态度对这个案子进行检讨。
有兴趣的网友，可以参考：
http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/documents/densmore/densmore_etal07.pdf
M.A.Jones: My position on Tibetan issue
The whole disucussion thread is introduced to me by netizen Willy, originally from a closed PBS discussion forum with title In response to Tony Martin (in relation to the Tibet issue). That’s a very long thread and below is excerpt of Jones’ summary on his position. Although there is only statements below, you can easily find more “empirically verifiable research data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature” in the thread.
I agree the overall frame of his position but disagree on several points. In general, I think that’s a good starter for Tibetan issue.
BTW, I can’t contact M.A.Jones at the moment. So the post is here w/o his permission.
===============================================================
Let me summarise my overall position on the Tibetan issue, so as to help those of you who are interested in producing a rebuttal. My arguments are as follows:
1. Human rights abuses have and continue to occur in Tibet, but the extent of these abuses has been and continues to be greatly exaggerated by the Tibetan Government in Exile and by its Western supporters in the so-called “pro-Tibet lobby”.
2. The human rights conditions and overall living standards of the majority of Tibetans has been and continues to improve under Chinese rule, and this has been the case since the Deng reforms were first introduced.
3. Most ill-feelings towards the Han Chinese and towards Chinese rule reflect the collective memory of the Cultural Revolution experience. The strength of these feelings is now beginning to fade as more and more Tibetans are drawn into the middle class, and their lives made more comfortable. Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly divided on their attitudes towards Chinese rule, and their feelings more complex and open to flux.
4. Tibetan culture is not, contrary to the propaganda of the pro-Tibet lobby, in any danger of disappearing. Quite the opposite in fact – Tibet, over the past few decades, has been and continues to experience a cultural renaissance, spurred on partly by financial grants and encouragement from Beijing, and partly through the initiative of ethnic Tibetans themselves, as they seize on the opportunities that increasing tourism brings to share their cultural life in newly commodified forms.
5. Rather than being “Sinocised” urban Tibet is being Westernised. Tibet’s transition from feudalism to modernity has been a painful one, but one that many Tibetans are now embracing as they see the benefits filtering through. Young Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly less interested in religious and independence issues as they discover and embrace more de-sublimated forms of pleasure through shopping, the internet, discos, kareoke bars, and, for the smaller but growing number of wealthier bougeois individuals among them (most of whom are drawn, not surprisingly, from the families of religious tulkas) the joys of both domestic and international travel and study.
6. The traditional political activities of organised Tibetan religious intitutions throughout the TAR have been restrained, and continue to be restrained (often brutally) under Chinese governance, but generally speaking lamaism is thriving – not only throughout the TAR, but also throughout greater China (even in Beijing) and internationally too for that matter. Considerable religious freedom then, despite claims to the contrary, exists in Tibet.
7. The Tibetan Government in Exile mislead the world about the true nature of the majority of those Tibetans who journey to Dharmasala each year – most are not refugees, but religious pilgrims. The Tibetan Government in Exile has both financial and political incentives to do so.
8. The Tibetan Government in Exile and its Western supporters in the pro-Tibet lobby are funded mostly by those whose economic and political interests view China’s rise as a threat. The U.S. State Department is the major contributor of funds to both the Government in Exile and to the Tibet lobby. Considerable funds are also raised through commercial activities, like international Dalai Lama lecture tours, and through the sale of Buddhist kitsch to Western New Age consumers.
9. Pro-Tibetan lobby groups essentially parade as “non-profit” human rights organisations, registering themselves as charities to encourage businesses and individuals to make tax-deductible donations – which essentially means that they are a drain on the public purse. They also have a vested interest in grossly exaggerating their claims in order to excite the sympathies of the public so that they can attract public donations and political support.
10. That by failing to present a fair and more realistic picture of what is happening in Tibet, both the self-proclaimed Tibetan Government in Exile and their supporters actually cause far more harm than good to the plight of the Tibetan people, especially for those living within the TAR. Their propaganda and support encourages hardliners within the ethnic Tibetan community living within the TAR to promote resistance and separatism, which in turn adds to the anxieties and security concerns of those hardliners within the Chinese ruling elite, who then in turn respond by introducing and enforcing more strictly those public security laws that restrict politico-religious activities – which as I said earlier, often do in fact result in brutal punishments by over-zealous enforcers. Such instances, not surprisingly then, tend to occur in waves, rather than on a regular day to day basis.
11. The main long-term political goal of the former ruling theocratic elite, now based in Dharmasala, is to regain their political control of Tibet. Their international campaign against China therefore, rather ironically, does more harm to their own cause than good, and only decreases their likelihood of ever being able to cut a deal with Beijing. The watered down goal of the Dalai Lama now, is the establishment of self-government for the TAR whilst remaining a part of China – in the same way that Hong Kong operates. Ironically, this is EXACTLY what China originally offered the Tibetan ruling elite, but by rejecting the offer in favour of supporting a separatist movement for full independence, they have now lost out completely. Easily the single biggest political mistake of the Dalai Lama’s career – as A. Tom Grunfeld has convincingly pointed out.
M.A.Jones: My position on Tibetan issue
The whole disucussion thread is introduced to me by netizen Willy, originally from a closed PBS discussion forum with title In response to Tony Martin (in relation to the Tibet issue). That’s a very long thread and below is excerpt of Jones’ summary on his position. Although there is only statements below, you can easily find more “empirically verifiable research data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature” in the thread.
I agree the overall frame of his position but disagree on several points. In general, I think that’s a good starter for Tibetan issue.
BTW, I can’t contact M.A.Jones at the moment. So the post is here w/o his permission.
===============================================================
Let me summarise my overall position on the Tibetan issue, so as to help those of you who are interested in producing a rebuttal. My arguments are as follows:
1. Human rights abuses have and continue to occur in Tibet, but the extent of these abuses has been and continues to be greatly exaggerated by the Tibetan Government in Exile and by its Western supporters in the so-called “pro-Tibet lobby”.
2. The human rights conditions and overall living standards of the majority of Tibetans has been and continues to improve under Chinese rule, and this has been the case since the Deng reforms were first introduced.
3. Most ill-feelings towards the Han Chinese and towards Chinese rule reflect the collective memory of the Cultural Revolution experience. The strength of these feelings is now beginning to fade as more and more Tibetans are drawn into the middle class, and their lives made more comfortable. Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly divided on their attitudes towards Chinese rule, and their feelings more complex and open to flux.
4. Tibetan culture is not, contrary to the propaganda of the pro-Tibet lobby, in any danger of disappearing. Quite the opposite in fact – Tibet, over the past few decades, has been and continues to experience a cultural renaissance, spurred on partly by financial grants and encouragement from Beijing, and partly through the initiative of ethnic Tibetans themselves, as they seize on the opportunities that increasing tourism brings to share their cultural life in newly commodified forms.
5. Rather than being “Sinocised” urban Tibet is being Westernised. Tibet’s transition from feudalism to modernity has been a painful one, but one that many Tibetans are now embracing as they see the benefits filtering through. Young Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly less interested in religious and independence issues as they discover and embrace more de-sublimated forms of pleasure through shopping, the internet, discos, kareoke bars, and, for the smaller but growing number of wealthier bougeois individuals among them (most of whom are drawn, not surprisingly, from the families of religious tulkas) the joys of both domestic and international travel and study.
6. The traditional political activities of organised Tibetan religious intitutions throughout the TAR have been restrained, and continue to be restrained (often brutally) under Chinese governance, but generally speaking lamaism is thriving – not only throughout the TAR, but also throughout greater China (even in Beijing) and internationally too for that matter. Considerable religious freedom then, despite claims to the contrary, exists in Tibet.
7. The Tibetan Government in Exile mislead the world about the true nature of the majority of those Tibetans who journey to Dharmasala each year – most are not refugees, but religious pilgrims. The Tibetan Government in Exile has both financial and political incentives to do so.
8. The Tibetan Government in Exile and its Western supporters in the pro-Tibet lobby are funded mostly by those whose economic and political interests view China’s rise as a threat. The U.S. State Department is the major contributor of funds to both the Government in Exile and to the Tibet lobby. Considerable funds are also raised through commercial activities, like international Dalai Lama lecture tours, and through the sale of Buddhist kitsch to Western New Age consumers.
9. Pro-Tibetan lobby groups essentially parade as “non-profit” human rights organisations, registering themselves as charities to encourage businesses and individuals to make tax-deductible donations – which essentially means that they are a drain on the public purse. They also have a vested interest in grossly exaggerating their claims in order to excite the sympathies of the public so that they can attract public donations and political support.
10. That by failing to present a fair and more realistic picture of what is happening in Tibet, both the self-proclaimed Tibetan Government in Exile and their supporters actually cause far more harm than good to the plight of the Tibetan people, especially for those living within the TAR. Their propaganda and support encourages hardliners within the ethnic Tibetan community living within the TAR to promote resistance and separatism, which in turn adds to the anxieties and security concerns of those hardliners within the Chinese ruling elite, who then in turn respond by introducing and enforcing more strictly those public security laws that restrict politico-religious activities – which as I said earlier, often do in fact result in brutal punishments by over-zealous enforcers. Such instances, not surprisingly then, tend to occur in waves, rather than on a regular day to day basis.
11. The main long-term political goal of the former ruling theocratic elite, now based in Dharmasala, is to regain their political control of Tibet. Their international campaign against China therefore, rather ironically, does more harm to their own cause than good, and only decreases their likelihood of ever being able to cut a deal with Beijing. The watered down goal of the Dalai Lama now, is the establishment of self-government for the TAR whilst remaining a part of China – in the same way that Hong Kong operates. Ironically, this is EXACTLY what China originally offered the Tibetan ruling elite, but by rejecting the offer in favour of supporting a separatist movement for full independence, they have now lost out completely. Easily the single biggest political mistake of the Dalai Lama’s career – as A. Tom Grunfeld has convincingly pointed out.
